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The Uniform Comimercial Code is not a "code" in the continental
sense, because it does not enact an entire and exclusive body of law. In
the same sense, an examination of any part of the Commercial Code
is a deceptive study, because it is the part-to-part-to-whole relation which
is important and, ultimately, will decide the cases which influence its
meaning.
Perhaps Part 6 is a discrete entity within Article 2 more than any
other single part. Even the elements of the title-breach, repudiation and
excuse-cover many more situational possibilities than the sections on
formation of the contract, remedies, and other more or less homogenous
parts. It is, in fact, a conglomeration of ideas which have been char-
acterized by Professors Llewellyn and Mentschikoff as the "self-help"
rights,1 and despite their varied origins and emphasis, they share a
heritage which was important to the common law. That is to say, they
are found, sometimes in an inchoate form, in what Llewellyn describes
constantly in his Notes as the "sound" or "better" cases, and they are
mostly iconoclastic under traditional concepts of sales and contract law.
The writer selected Part 6 because it seemed to be the part of Article
2 which would endure long after the others ceased to have interest. By
this I mean that the notions expressed in Part 2, for example, concerning
the formation of contracts, are simply the long overdue codification of
concepts which have been ascendant or tacitly accepted, in the inelucta-
ble growth of the common law. Will the next generation of lawyers seri-
ously accept the notion that an option is not binding unless it is under
*Professor of Law, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. The assistance of
Herbert David Blair, editor of the ARKANSAS LAW REvIEw, 1964-1965, in assem-
bling footnotes is gratefully acknowledged.
1. Perhaps reflecting a wrongly placed emphasis, the writer in the past re-
ferred to these concepts as the "quasi-remedies," because of their applicability when
breach of the sales zontract is threatened or incipient. Spies, Sales: Article II, 16
AR. L. REv. 6 (1962).
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seal, or given for consideration, or within the modest confines of the
Uniform Written Obligations Act? It seems unlikely. But the next genera-
tion of lawyers may well be faced by what now appear to be disruptive
spectres to us-excuse by failure of presupposed conditions, the demand
for adequate assurance of performance, and other unfamiliar titles in
Part 6. The reason for their imminence is not the enacting of a Code; it is
rather the changing concepts among businessmen about the means of re-
solving disputes.
It seems to the writer that anyone who has written about a statute
inevitably is caught up in a feeling of genuine despair when asked to do
it again. A statute must be read and read carefully to be understood,
much less appreciated if it contains artistic drafting, unless the interlocutor
is willing to take on the responsibility for a disarmingly simple but incom-
plete exposition of all its terms. Therefore, although some of the following
material briefly summarizes statutory material, it is not offered and
must not be accepted as a substitute for reading the Code and the relevant
comments. The concession herein to difficulty is that this treatment fol-
lows the section by section order of the Code, so that a minimum of cross-
paging is necessary.
Professor Llewellyn's understanding of the development of Anglo-
American common-law was far too profound to admit the possibility that
Article 2, and Part 6 in particular, sprang full-blown from the whole cloth
of his imagination, despite the growling of some critics. Case references in
the official comments are sparse. The announced thrust of the promulgators
of the Uniform Commercial Code is that it is a fresh start in many areas;
one should question the meaning of its terms rather than its antecedents.
There is almost the subtle suggestion that one who questions origins is
mid-Victorian, since it is the quality of the baby and not his progenitors
which matters. But the question persists: what are the origins of the Code,
and, more precisely, of Part 6?
When the writer asked this question of the associate reporter of
Article 2, Professor Mentschikoff, she suggested that the answers might be
found in locked files at the University of Chicago which contained her
husband's notes and memoranda. Therefore, the substantive part of this
article deals with the Code on two levels. First, what is the meaning of
the various sections of Part 6? Second, do the materials used in the
preparation of the article perhaps suggest motivations, intentions or
methods in its drafting which might be useful in understanding the Unii-
form Commercial Code provisions in general?
[Vol. 30
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In the following, the term "comments" refers to the official text fol-
lowing the statutory section; the term Notes refers to the Llewellyn ma-
terial obtained by the writer from the files. Some of the latter are hand-
written. Others obviously are notations to the Uniform Revised Sales Act,
on which much of Article 2 is based; they are typed and presumably
copies were sent to other drafters of that era, but they do not appear to
have been published and, as nearly as one can estimate, they come from
the middle or late 1940's. Whenever possible, the Notes are cited, so that
reference can be made if eventually they are published.
II. FAMILIAR CONCEPTS WITH MODIFICATIONS
UCC section 400.2-601, RSMo 1963 Supp. permits the buyer to re-
ject goods if they "or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to con-
form to the contract." The clause "fail in any respect" is to be given
literal application: even though the seller's tender may be referable to
the contract, if the goods are defective or there is "an improper manner of
shipment, failure of contractual documents, delay or any other reason"
why the tender does not match the contract, it will fail.2 The Code
section thus embraces a variety of non-conformity situations which were
scattered through the old Uniform Sales Act.3
Commercial buyers rarely order goods which they do not need, and
the buyer may be under considerable trade pressure to accept a non-con-
forming tender. As a practical matter, the inclination to accept may in-
crease in inverse proportion to the seriousness of the breach. Under prior
law if the breach was slight the buyer might be in danger of losing his
more effective remedies if he accepted the entire lot of goods, although
he could make a partial acceptance if the price was "apportionable." The
Uniform Commercial Code principle is that partial acceptance is permitted
2. Notes, Comment on § 7-1 (S 90) at 1. This is the citation form which
will be hereinafter used to refer to Professor Karl N. 'Llewellyn's notes, some of
which appear intended for distribution among other drafters. Photocopies of the
Notes relating to Part 6 are filed at the University of Arkansas School of Law.
It is not known what the first number has reference to, but the number following
enclosed in parentheses and preceded by a capital S apparently refers to a later
edition of the Uniform Revised Sales Act, as explained in text. Bracketed refer-
ences to the Uniform Commercial Code are the writer's substitutions for original
citations to the Revised Sales Act.
3. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 44 (discrepancies in quality); UNIFORM SALES
Acr § 69(1) (defects in dins or quality); UNIFORM SAi s Acr §§ 11, 41, 43 (dis-
crepancies in time, place or manner of delivery).
19651
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if the price can reasonably be apportioned. Furthermore, Comment 1 to
UCC section 2-601 says, "Partial acceptance is permitted whether the
part of the goods accepted conforms or not." This, the Notes indicate, is a
rejection of holdings typified by E. Hardy & Co. v. Hillerns & Fowler,'
in which a buyer, prior to inspection, had diverted part of a grain ship-
ment to a subpurchaser. After inspection revealed the entire shipment
to be below standard, the buyer was not permitted to reject because the
diversion was an acceptance by an act inconsistent with the seller's owner-
ship. By way of dictum, the court alluded to the question of whether the
buyer could have rejected the portion of the goods over which he had
not vicariously exercised ownership rights and said:
[T]here could not be an acceptance of part and a rejection of the
balance; that can be done when a portion of the goods is obviously
in accordance with the contract and another part is not, but
where the same objection applies to the whole quantity, and a
portion has been accepted notwithstanding the objection, there
cannot be a rejection of a part.6
The Code rule seems a reasonable one in the light of commercial expecta-
tions, although it is based on a rejection of dictum in an English case
which is not considered by later English authority.
In order to forestall a buyer picking over and arbitrarily selecting
what he wants from a shipment of diverse goods, perhaps in a falling
market, subsection (c) requires him to "accept any commercial unit or
units and reject the rest."'7 According to the definition in section 400.2-
105(6), this term, wholly unknown in prior law, "means such a unit of
goods as by commercial usage is a single whole for purposes of sale and
division of which materially impairs its character or value on the market
or in use." This "impairment test" differs from pre-Code emphasis, which
looked to what units the parties had identified in the contract itself, a
concept which the Code specifically rejects.8
4. Comment 1 to § 2-607, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT
WITH COMMENTS, published by the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws [hereinafter cited UCC
(1962) with a section number, e.g., UCC § 2-607 (1962)].
5. [19233 1 K.B. 658, aff'd, [1923] 2 K.B. 490 (C.A.). Subsequent English
cases citing the Hardy case are limited to the question of what acts are of a type
inconsistent with the seller's ownership of the goods in question. See e.g., Kwei Tek
Chao v. British Traders & Shippers Ltd., [1954] 2 Q.B. 459.
6. E. Hardy & Co. v. Hillerns & Fowler, [1923) 1 K.B. 658, 666.
7. § 400.2-601(c), RSMo 1963 Supp.
8. Comment 1 to UCC § 2-601 (1962).
[Vol. 30
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The Notes suggest that the concept of "commercial unit" results from
the amalgamation of two quite distinct ideas in the law of contracts.9 In
emphasizing that the Code adopts the result but not the reasoning of an
early case10 it is apparent that Llewellyn intended this section to re-
pudiate the "entire-severable" contract theory and to rest the definition
of commercial unit on more practical commercial judgment.1 " Second, in
support of the further test that dividing up a commercial unit would ad-
versely change the market character of the remainder, Llewellyn cites in
the Notes a single Arkansas decision, Berger v. Kohler & Romer.12 In it
the buyer agreed to buy a suit for $150.00, with two pairs of trousers if
the seller could secure enough material. Only one pair was delivered, but
buyer wore the suit for a while before he returned it. The seller sued for
the "indivisible" price of $150.00, but the jury awarded only $100-the
contract price less the value of the pair of trousers which was never de-
livered.
Although the result seems a just one, the Berger case has never been
cited in Arkansas or elsewhere. How well it suited Llewellyn's purpose is
speculative: the buyer was not attempting to invoke the partial accept-
ance concept but was seeking to avoid liability for the part accepted be-
cause of the seller's failure to deliver the entire amount called for in the
contract. In actuality, the case presents the opposite side of the coin,
since the court's holding is that the buyer's action amounted to an elec-
tion to treat the contract as divisible, thus barring him from asserting the
defective tender defensively.
UCC section 400.2-601 is relatively brief and uncomplicated compared
with later sections, and fairness requires pointing out at once that the
many other cases cited in the Notes stand examination better than the few
which appear under this section of the Code.
UCC section 400.2-602, concerning the manner and effect of a right-
9. Notes, Comment on § 7-1 (S 90) at 3.
10. Pacific Timber Co. v. Iowa Windmill & Pump Co., 135 Iowa 308, 112
N.W. 771 (1907). For a case which reaches an opposite result on similar facts see
Steams Salt & Lbr. Co. v. Dennis Lbr. Co., 188 Mich. 700, 154 N.W. 91 (1915).
11. The severability-divisibility dichotomy has never been a wholly satis-
factory method of analysis and solution of cases. As stated in Spartan Aircraft Co.
v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 171, 173-74 (Ct. Cl. 1951):
The severability, or divisibility, of a contract is a vexing problem.
... The authorities hold that the question is essentially one of the in-
tention of the parties; examination of some of the many cases on the point
suggests rather that resolution of the question has more commonly been
a matter of the intention of the court.
12. 166 Ark. 496, 266 S.W. 454 (1924).
19651
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ful rejection of goods by the buyer, amplifies its counterpart, Uniform
Sales Act section 50, although notice to the seller of the buyer's decision
is retained as the principal feature of successfully avoiding an acceptance.
Comment 1 refers the reader to UCC section 400.1-201 for a definition of
what constitutes a due "notifying." This is, of course, a general provision
and does not specifically concern notification in rejection of goods. The
Notes contain some helpful examples which are specific:
Where the buyer has actually taken the goods into his possession,
a properly mailed letter or a duly dispatched telegram will suf-
fice. If the goods are refused on trucks, the actual rejection must
still be followed by seasonable notice to the seller. [The Code]
does not cover the manner of rejection of defective documents
tendered against a demand for payment but it is clear that a re-
fusal by the buyer to take up the documents amounts to a rejec-
tion of the goods which they cover. Further, the communication
of such a refusal to the financing agency holding and presenting
the documents is an adequate giving of notice to the seller."3
Perhaps this additional material is surplusage in the light of the mean-
ing and context of the definition in UCC section 400.1-201(26), but it is
at least arguable that its inclusion would have been helpful to the reader
who lacks a background in commercial practice. Nor would inclusion seem
to imply that the process of notification is necessarily limited to the
examples given.
An added ingredient in proper rejection of goods under the Code
is the requirement in section 400.2-602(1) that rejection must take place
"within a reasonable time" after delivery or tender. If nothing else, in-
corporating a reasonable time provision makes specific what the Uniform
Sales Act left to conjecture in section 50, but the importance of the term
really lies in its influence on the concept of inspection. There is only the
passing reference in Comment 1 that the sections on inspection14 must be
read in conjunction with the buyer's reasonable time for action under
this section. The Notes make it far more clear than the comment by a
more thorough cross-referencing. For one thing, the buyer will not be
held to have accepted the goods by inaction and silence until he has had
a reasonable opportunity to inspect them.25 Under section 400.2-512,
13. Notes, Comment on § 7-2 (S 91) at 3.
14. §§ 400.2-512, 2-513, RSMo 1963 Supp.
15. § 400.2-606(1) (a), RSMo 1963 Supp.
[Vol. 30
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if the contract requires the buyer to pay before inspection, acceptance of
and payment against a tender of documents prior to inspection of the
goods will not operate as an acceptance of the goods themselves. And
in section 400.2-513, the buyer is assured of an opportunity to make an
ultimate inspection of the goods at a reasonable time and place, in a
reasonable manner. In every sense, these sections are truly ancillary to
the gift of reasonable time to reject bestowed by section 400.2-602.
Further provisions of this section are self-explanatory. The buyer
cannot perform acts amounting to conversion of the goods after having
rejected them,16 although here his exercise of ownership is wrongful only
to the extent of any commercial unit over which he exercises dominion.
Therefore, if the goods can be divided into commercial units, he does
not run the risk of exercising dominion over the mole-hill and thereby
find himself having converted the mountain, as in the past, quite possibly
by some inadvertent act of dominion or control.
Uniform Sales Act section 50 provided that after a rightful rejection
of goods, the buyer "is not bound to return them to the seller" but had an
obligation only to give notice. The Code more carefully spells out the
buyer's obligation in this situation, "to hold them with reasonable care...
for a time sufficient to permit the seller to remove them," and so lessens
the danger of misunderstanding at a time when the relations of the
parties may be strained.
UCC sections 400.2-603 and 400.2-604 deal more fully with the rights
of the parties after rightful rejection. The first of these sections imposes
a positive duty on a merchant buyer to follow the seller's reasonable
instructions after a rightful rejection when the seller has no agent at the
market of rejection, as to goods "in his possession or control." Further-
more, section 400.2-603 (1) places an affirmative duty on the buyer "in
the absence of such instructions to make reasonable efforts to sell them
for the seller's account if they are perishable or threaten to decline in
value speedily." Llewellyn's Notes make it obvious that "possession and
control" of the buyer is not tested by personal property concepts. The
words are to have a broad effect. For example, if the goods consigned to
the buyer are rejected on the tracks they are sufficiently within the con-
trol of the buyer, since the carrier will accept his instructions to deliver
or reship. 17
16. § 400.2-606(2) (a), RSMo 1963 Supp.
17. Notes, Comment on § 7-3 (S 92) at 3.
19651
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Section 400.2-603 is rooted in and elaborates on the famous case of
Descalzi Fruit Co. v. William Sweet & Son, Inc.,is in which a buyer was
held justified in making a salvage sale of properly rejected peaches for
the seller's account. The elaboration exists in the Code's statement that
the seller's instructions are not reasonable if the buyer's demand of in-
demnity for expenses is not met, and the specification of what expenses
or commission may be recovered by the buyer in subsection (2).
UCC section 400.2-603 does not mention, however, whether the buyer
must give notice of his intention to dispose of the goods. Since notice
is essential to a rightful rejection,19 and the assumption seems to be that
notice of rejection of goods which the parties know to be perishable need
not be augmented by a further notice, in the absence of seller's instruc-
tions, that the buyer now plans to resell the goods. This is perhaps un-
fortunate, because the more perishable or deteriorated the goods, the more
quickly action may have to be taken, and it may be difficult for the buyer
to give adequate notice. Moreover, the courts have required notice of
intention to resell perishables,20 although at least one court recognized
the problem, after adopting the Descalzi case:
We think the same rule would apply where notice could not be
given to the seller; and if the circumstances were such that im-
mediate action was necessary to preserve the property from dam-
age, the buyer would be in the same position as if the seller had
refused to give disposition after notice.21
All that is probably required of the buyer in exercising his rights under
the Code section is that he act in good faith, and perhaps the concept
is broad enough to include the dispensing with notice when swift action
is necessary to realize as much as possible in disposing of perishables.
Closely related to the foregoing is section 400.2-604, which provides
a number of options which the buyer may exercise if he fails to receive
18. 30 R.I. 320, 75 Atl. 308 (1910). In White v. Schweitzer, 221 N.Y. 461,
117 N.E. 941 (1917), the court, in justifying the buyer's salvage sale of turkeys,
emphasized the absence of instructions from the seller. In Baker v. J. C. Watson
Co., 64 Idaho 573, 134 P.2d 613 (1943), the buyer's sale was upheld in the ab-
sence of instructions, notwithstanding contention by the seller that sale before
insufficient time for spoilage amounted to an acceptance. The Baker case also
anticipates the duty to sell perishables adopted by the Code: "UTnder these cir-
cumstances . . . there operated the rule that the buyer should do everything to
lessen injury or damage, which, of course, required the immediate sale of these
peaches since they were perishable ... ." Id. at 584-85, 134 P.2d at 618.
19. § 400.2-602(1), RSMo 1963 Supp.
20. Grainger Bros. Co. v. G. Amsinck & Co., 15 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1926).
21. Barnett v. Perrine, 250 S.W. 1111, 1114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
[Vol. 30
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instructions from the seller as to rightfully rejected non-perishable goods.
As the comment explains, the buyer may store, reship or resell for the
seller's account after due notification of rejection, although the alternative
courses open to him are not intended to be exclusive. This section differs
from section 400.2-603, which positively requires a merchant buyer to
dispose of the goods in the situations mentioned. Llewellyn's Notes provide
a further clue to the motivation behind this section:
At the time of rejection it not infrequently happens that a real
doubt is present in the buyer's mind as to the rightfulness of his
action and this presents one of the knottiest problems in the law
of sales. So many factors enter into the problem that even a buyer
who believes in good faith that a tender is non-conforming, is well
aware of the risk that a subsequent trier of the fact may disagree
with him. [The Code] seeks to reduce the importance of this ques-
tion, at least in part, by means of [UCC section 400.2-601] per-
mitting partial acceptance, [UCC section 400.2-515] on preserv-
ing evidence of goods in dispute and third party inspection . . .
and [UCC section 400.2-605] on particularization of objections by
the buyer.22
After a proper rejection, the seller under the Code has a number of
options open to him: he may cure, 23 request a written statement of de-
fects from the buyer or insist on inspection-and his failure to avail him-
self of any of these options coupled with his failure to instruct the buyer
surely presents a question of bad faith on the seller's part that the trier
of fact may consider.
Both sections 400.2-603 and 400.2-604, then, are designed to avoid
the buyer's being "tricked" into a technical acceptance. The Notes ex-
pressly reject cases which reach this result.24
In the rapid metabolism of modem business, buyer's expressions of
rejection often are stated in very general terms ("entire shipment unsuit-
able"), and the seller is unaware of the precise nature of the complaint.
Since the purpose of Part 6 of Article 2 is to negotiate around impending
law suits, it is not surprising that section 400.2-605 permits the seller to
demand of the buyer a written statement of his objections to the goods.
Moreover, because there is a suspicion that the general statement of re-
22. Notes, Comment on § 7-4 (S 93) at 1.
23. § 400.2-508, RSMo 1963 Supp.
24. Notes, Comment on § 7-4 (S 93). Scriven v. Hecht, 287 Fed. 853 (2d Cir.
1923) (non-conformity of horse hides; buyer requested instructions in vain and
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jection may conceal the buyer's bad faith in attempting to welch on the
contract, statements of this kind are insufficient if the defect is one which
the seller might have cured.2 1 If the parties are merchants, the seller may
demand written particulars. The buyer's failure to respond is a waiver of
unstated objections to the goods.
As drafted, the Code section indicates simply that this is new law,
the Uniform Sales Act not having a comparable section, and the com-
ments cite no decisional authority in opposition to or supporting it.
In fact, the Code provision lays to rest a rather harsh doctrine some-
times called the rule of Littlejohim v. Shaw,26 which limited the buyer to
those defects which he stated in his initial rejection. Of course, the rule
has been useful, as the Notes state, "mainly as a means of defeating
surprise rejections of what would have been mercantilely acceptable de-
liveries were it not for a falling market." In view of the seller's right to
cure, the rule of Littlejokn v. Shaw is no longer necessary.
Subsection (2) of UCC section 400.2-605 precludes recovery by the
buyer for defects apparent on the face of documents when payment is
made against them. Comment 4 indicates, perhaps more clearly than the
statutory language itself, that the waiver applies only to defects in the
25. § 400.2-508, RSMo 1963 Supp.
26. 159 N.Y. 188, 53 N.E. 810 (1899). It is interesting to note that at
least one jurist would limit the Littlejohn case -by holding it inapplicable to a
unilateral contract situation. F. Kieser & Son Co. v. Hallock, 201 App. Div. 186,
189, 194 N.Y. Supp. 737, 740 (1922) (Kellogg, J., concurring). This opinion
utilizes a curious manipulation of contract doctrines to mitigate the effect
of the Littlejohn case. A case strongly opposed to the rigidity of the Littlejohn
case was List & Son Co. v. Chase, 80 Ohio St. 42, 88 N.E. 120 (1909) where it
was held that, in order for a specific objection to preclude any later one on other
grounds, the buyer's conduct in making the objection must have been tantamount
to a waiver or sufficient to give rise to an estoppel. The List case is frequently
cited for its definition of a waiver as an intentional relinquishment of a known
right. See, e.g., McMillen v. Willys Sales Corp., 118 Ohio App. 20, 193 N.E.2d
160 (1962). The principle of the List case has also been applied to situations in-
volving contracts for the sale of realty. C. 0. Frick Co. v. Baetzel, 169 Mass. 297,
47 N.E.2d 1919 (1942). A case which qualifies the application of the Littlejohn
rule, although not going as far as List, is Fielding v. Robertson, 141 Va. 123, 126
S.E. 231 (1925), which held that a defect not objected to must be known at the
time objection is made on other grounds before defect not objected to will be
deemed waived.
In view of the use of the verbs "precludes" and "relying" in section 400.2-605
of the Code one can speculate that this section is codification of the estoppel
aspect of the List case rather than a waiver section, although the section uses
'Waiver" in the title. In connection with this apparent inconsistency of terminol-
ogy consider the language of Comment 1 to the section which states one of the
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documents which are apparent on the fact of the documents but does not
go beyond this statement in explanation or illustration. The Notes on this
point, however, continue in this fashion:
Thus, in Lamboriz v. Seggerman, (1925) 240 N.Y. 118, 147 N.E.
607, the contract was for a car of 1200 cases of apples, payment
draft against documents. A delivery order for 1200 cases out of a
car of 1770 cases was tendered and the buyer paid. The car had been
lost in transit by government seizure and the buyer was rightly
held entitled to recover his payment. Acceptance of a delivery order
for a non-conforming shipping unit waives only that formal de-
fect ... It accepts a non-contractual means of reaching the con-
tract goods, but it does not give up the substantial contractual
right to the goods themselves. Where the parties assume that the
goods are in fact available and conforming in quality, the buyer's
action in waiving a defect in the form of their tender, as a matter
of business decency and convenience, cannot be read as the tak-
ing over of a loss not contemplated at the time.27
The Lamborn case is useful exposition of what is meant by waiver of
only that which is apparent on the face of the document.
Broadly speaking, the concept of "acceptance" in the Code follows
the tripartite arrangement of the Uniform Sales Act section 48, i.e., accept-
ance can be by some overt indication by the buyer, or by failure to make
an effective rejection, or by acts amounting to a conversion of the goods.
There are several important distinctions in statutory emphasis, however.
The curious use of the verb "intimate" in the Uniform Sales Act raises
theoretical questions.2 8 Under it the buyer could intimate his acceptance
or his rejection of the goods, and one wonders what was sufficient to satisfy
the delicate nuances of the word-a raised eyebrow, perhaps, or a lip curled
in scorn, with never a word between the parties? In any event, the Code
requires only that the buyer "signifies" to the seller that the goods con-
form after he has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect them or that
he will take them despite non-conformity. Signify has connotations of
giving notice of some kind and seems more suited to a commercial statute.
Signification of acceptance conceivably might take a variety of forms.
The Notes enlarge on two limitations on signification which are briefly
27. Notes, Comment on § 7-5 (S 94).
28. This section states: "The buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods
when he intimates to the seller that he has accepted them . . .or when, after the
lapse of a reasonable time, he retains the goods without intimating to the seller
that he has rejected them." UNIFORM SALEs AcT § 48.
19651
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mentioned in Comment 2 to UCC section 400.2-606. First, payment made
after tender is a circumstance tending to show an acceptance but is not
conclusive. Second, the Code section as a whole is designed not to jockey
the buyer into an acceptance by attaching more significance to his act
of approval than the buyer intended. In other words, the buyer may suc-
cessfully make a conditional communication of acceptance, which will
remain subject to the express conditions. As the Notes put it:
Thus this Act approves the holding in Mitsubisti Goslhi Kaisha v.
J. Aron & Co. [16 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1926)], that the buyer's let-
ter expressing his intention to tender to a sub-buyer a car coming
forward under his contract with the seller, was not an acceptance of
the carload, when the buyer and seller were engaged at the time in
a dispute as to the shipping documents, which was not settled
because the seller did not comply with the conditions properly im-
posed by the buyer. However, under other circumstances a letter
from the buyer indicating his intention to sell the goods for his
own account, unless clearly conditioned upon the seller's cure of
the defective tender, might properly be held to evidence, or even
constitute, a disposition of the goods [as an act inconsistent with
the seller's ownership, under UCC section 400.2-606(1)(c).]12
Although the Mitsubishi case appears in a number of sales casebooks,
it has never once been cited. The paragraph quoted also introduces the
third manifestation of acceptance-an act inconsistent with the seller's
ownership. It is not difficult for a buyer to comply with this part of the
acceptance provision: resale or pledge of the goods on his own account,
use of the goods for his own purposes, or unjustified refusal to place the
rejected goods at the seller's disposition where the buyer has not, by
payment of part of the price, acquired a security interest.30 If there is a
conflict between the buyer's words of rejection and his acts of dominion,
cases cited in the Notes indicate that the latter are to prevail.3 '
An exception to the general rule that conversion is acceptance appears
in UCC section 400.2-606(1)(c): "but if such act is wrongful as against
the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by him." Only the last sentence
29. Notes, Comment on § 7-6 (S 95) at 3.
30. § 400.2-711(3), RSMo 1963 Supp.
31. See Foley & Co. v. Excelsior Stove & Mfg. Co., 265 Ill. App. 78 (1932)(inclusion of goods on insurance claim by buyer held to be act inconsistent with
the seller's ownership); Rice v. Green, 199 Wis. 518, 227 N.W. 22 (1929) (buyer's
displaying and advertising goods held to be an acceptance). But f. L. Albert &
Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1949) (claiming allowance
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in Comment 4 to the section refers to this provision, and, after noting
that it "modifies some of the prior case law," the comment further states
"'acceptance' in law based on the wrongful act of the acceptor is accept-
ance only as against the wrongdoer and then only at the option of the
party wronged," which adds little to the language or meaning of the Code
section.
The Code rule as stated is easily workable so long as no third parties
come into the picture. But what is the result when the buyer is a "merchant
who deals in goods of that kind"3 2 and the act inconsistent with the
seller's ownership is reselling the goods "to a buyer in the ordinary course
of business"? Then the seller's option not to ratify the wrongful acceptance
under section 400.2-606(1)(c) surely would become moot. The policy
behind this concept and its intended operation as between the buyer and
seller themselves or where a third party less than a bona fide purchaser
takes from the buyer is more fully explained in the Notes:
A result intended for relief should never operate to prejudice
the party for whose relief it is designed. The situation frequently
arises where jewels are turned over to a shoe-string "buyer-broker"
on terms which amount in law to a sale on approval, the under-
standing being that title is to remain in the "seller" until the
broker finds a purchaser at a profit, after which he is to bring in
the originally agreed price in cash. The courts have rightly viewed
a wrongful pledge or pawn of the jewels by the "buyer-broker" as
"an act inconsistent with the ownership of the seller" within the
Original Act, Section 48; but this does not warrant putting the
title into the "buyer-broker" except by an estoppel operating
against him personally at the option of the seller. [The Code]
therefore rejects any argument in favor of the pledge or pawn-
broker in such a case unless the seller has ratified the wrongful
disposition.33
A word more is perhaps necessary, about the meaning of the concept
of acceptance. Ordinarily, acceptance becomes important only when the
goods or the tender are such that they are subject to the buyer's rightful
rejection: that is, when they do not conform to the contract or have been
delivered on approval. Acceptance, moreover, has the protean ability to
become an issue at different junctures of the sales transaction: acceptance
in section 400.2-606(1)(a) and (c)-by affirmative words or acts-can
32. § 400.2-403(2), RSMo 1963 Supp.
33. Notes, Comment on § 7-6 (S 95) at 4.
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also be an acceptance for purposes of the Statute of Frauds." It has been
mentioned before that acceptance of documents is not acceptance of the
goods themselves,38 and the acceptance here discussed must not be con-
fused with the same term in section 400.2-206, dealing with acceptance
of an offer to contract.
Section 400.2-607 is the only section in Part 6 which brings together a
number of remotely related concepts, rather than dealing with a single
principle. Since it concerns the effect of acceptance this is quite natural,
because acceptance unquestionably alters the legal relation of the parties
on a number of levels.
Subsection (1) provides that "the buyer must pay at the contract
rate for any goods accepted," and this rule is reinforced by the subsec-
tion (4) provision that the buyer has the burden of establishing any
breach with respect to the goods accepted. These two propositions might
seem unnecessary or self-explanatory at first blush, but the Notes38 reveal
the problem which the drafters attempted to solve. "Occasional suggestions
in the case-law that the seller has the burden of showing compliance with
the contract to prove that he is entitled to the price extend properly only
to cases where the goods have not been accepted." 37 Thus, subsection (4),
placing the burden of proof on the buyer after acceptance, becomes purely
procedural when the accepted tender was non-conforming and the buyer
has given notice within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have
discovered the breach.8s This is because subsection (3) clearly leaves un-
impaired the buyer's right to be made whole, including not only his
money remedies, but, according to Comment 3, his full rights with respect
to future installments despite his acceptance of any earlier non-conforming
34. § 400.2-201, RSMo 1963 Supp. The Uniform Sales Act defined "accept-
ance" separately for Statute of Frauds purposes. UNIFORM SALES Act § 4(3).
35. See text accompanying notes 15 and 27 supra.
36. Notes, Comment on § 7-7 (S 96) at 1.
37. Ibid. See Frankel v. Foreman & Clark, Inc., 33 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1929).
Compare John Fabick Tractor Co. v. Lizza & Sons, Inc., 298 F.2d 63 (2d Cir.
1962); Alper Blouse Co. v. E. E. Connor & Co., 309 N.Y. 67, 127 N.E.2d 813 (1955).
38. Notice need not be detailed at this juncture. The comments to the Code
state that it must inform the seller that "the transaction is claimed to involve
a breach, and thus opens the way for normal settlement through negotiation.'
Comment 4 to UCC § 2-607 (1962). This overcomes the stringency of some prior
cases. See, e.g., Adler v. United States, 270 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1959); Truslow &
Fulle, Inc. v. Diamond Bottling Corp., 112 Conn. 181, 151 Atl. 492 (1930). In
Clarizo v. Spada Distributing Co., 231 Ore. 516, 373 P.2d 689 (1962) the court
found a buyer's unequivocal rejection of the seller's offer to reduce the price of
the goods to be sufficient notice of intent to claim damages. The court was ostensi-
bly applying the more stringent rule generally followed by courts under section
49 of the Uniform Sales Act although recognition was given to the more liberal
treatment recommended by section 400.2-607 of the Code.
[Vol. 30
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installment. This provision is designed to overcome the effect of cases hold-
ing that a buyer who used an early defective shipment to fill immediate
needs was not permitted to "rescind" the sale as to future installments. "
Subsection (3)(b) applies a special rule of notice where the buyer is sued
for infringement, requiring the buyer to notify the seller within a reasonable
time after he receives notice of the litigation, or lose his remedies over
against the seller"4
The most important innovations in sales law contained in section
400.2-607 are various provisions- giving a seller an opportunity to defend
or compromise third-party claims or to be relieved of liability, and con-
ferring on the defendant buyer the concomitant right to vouch in a seller
who is answerable over. The section helps to resolve an area of genuine
uncertainty under prior law.4 2
The purpose of section 400.2-608, permitting a revocation of accept-
ance by the buyer, is to overcome the old rule which forced a buyer to
elect between return of the goods and damages. It is the counterpart of
the Code rule which permits a seller to "rescind" the contract and still
sue the buyer for damages for non-acceptance. 3 Again the origin of the
Code section lies in cases under the Uniform Sales Act which sought to
avoid the harsh rule of election under a number of subterfuges: exten-
sion of the time for acceptance to provide reasonable time for inspection,
treating the buyer's acceptance as tentative," or extending the field of
"incidental" damages.
For revocation of acceptance, there must be a nonconformity which
"substantially impairs" the value of a lot or commercial unit, and the
39. See, e.g., John Service, Inc. v. Goodnow-Pearson Co., 242 Mass. 594, 136
N.E. 623 (1922). But see Agoos Kid Co. v. Blumenthal Import Corp., 282 Mass.
1, 184 N.E. 279 (1932). It is interesting to note that the Agoos Kid case was fol-
lowed in preference to the John Service case in a fairly modern federal decision,
Universal Major Elec. Appliances, Inc. v. Glenwood Range Co., 233 F.2d 76 (4th
Cir. 1955). For earlier cases which appear to be in accord with the Code treat-
ment see Interstate Grocer Co. v. Colorado Milling & Elevator Co., 199 Ark. 645,
135 S.W.2d 661 (1940); Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Oppenhiem Oberndorf & Co., 114
Md. 368, 79 At. 1007 (1911); Shotwell Johnson Co. v. C. 0. D. Tractor Co., 154
Minn. 417, 191 N.W. 813 (1923); Kansas Flour Mills Corp. v. McDonald, 32
S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
40. Infringement was not considered in the Uniform Sales Act. The sub-
stantive rules are contained in § 400.2-312, RSMo 1963 Supp.
41. § 400.2-607(3) (b), (5) and (6), RSMo 1963 Supp.
42. The best recent treatment of the procedural problems raised by the
section is in HONNOLD, LAw OF SALES AND SALES FINANCING 52 (2d ed. 1962).
43. § 400.2-703, RSMo 1963 Supp.
44. Belmont Silk Co. v. Noschkes, 189 N.Y.S. 112 (App. T. 1921); Fox v.
Boldt, 172 Wis. 333, 178 N.W. 467 (1920).
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buyer must have accepted on the assumption that the defect would have
been cured or without having discovered the defect. Non-discovery may
be grounded in latency of the defect or by the seller's assurances that the
goods would conform.
Revocation of acceptance must take place "within a reasonable time
after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it""
and is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller.
The question again arises: what must be the content of the notice to
make it adequate for purposes of this section? Good faith, prevention of
surprise and reasonable adjustment are all factors in the answer, according
to Comment 5, which vaguely adds, "More will generally be necessary
than mere notification of breach required [in the preceding section on
acceptance]." There is the suggestion that "notice" under the Uniform
Commercial Code is even a more subtly protean term than "acceptance,"
despite general definitions in Article 1.1 The Notes commenting on section
400.2-607 are more explicit by far than any single Code comment, perhaps
because revocation of acceptance is a new concept, and their usefulness can
be appraised by the reader:
In the normal case of a tender of delivery by a seller, there
are four periods of reasonable time within which various actions
by the buyer must be taken: (1) the reasonable time for rejec-
tion under [section 400.2-602] after tender; (2) the reasonable
time after acceptance during which the discovery of any non-con-
formity should be made either under [section 400.2-607] requir-
ing notice of breach or under the present [subsection] requiring
notice of revocation of acceptance; (3) the reasonable time after
discovery of the breach in which to give notice to the seller; and
(4) the further reasonable period during which the buyer actually
determines to revoke acceptance. In many situations these four
phases are cumulative but in others they must be sharply dis-
tinguished.
The reasonable time for rejection after tender of the goods
coincides with the period during which silence imposes accept-
ance on the buyer [section 400.2-606] on what constitutes ac-
ceptance of the goods. The two dominant factors here are, first,
the need of the seller for seasonable notice of any rejection of a
current delivery, and, second, the need of the buyer for a fair op-
portunity to inspect the goods before he acts. A typical case of
extended time for buyer's action due to the second factor is where
45. § 400.2-608(2), RSMo 1963 Supp.
46. § 400.1-203, RSMo 1963 Supp.
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goods intended for export reshipment are left in the original pack-
ages and rejected by the original buyer only after inspection by
his sub-purchaser.
The nature of the goods and of dealings in or with them is the
controlling consideration in determining the reasonable time for
discovering a breach after acceptance has occurred. Thus, a lot of
400 coats may require inspection garment by garment to discover
defects, and the practice of the trade may be to inspect a few care-
fully, tag and hang up the others, inspecting them only as mer-
chandising conditions require or permit. . . While rarely if ever
explicitly stated in the opinions, the course of the decisions in
the merchant-to-merchant cases runs clearly and soundly to this
effect: the more grave the lurking defect, the more liberal the
recognition of the reasonableness of any time taken "in ordinary
course" to discover it; per contra, if there is suspicion of captious-
ness, bad faith or a dropping market, the time for discovery is
strictly limited....
The third and fourth phases of reasonable time can best be
dealt with together, for [in] neither notice can be given until there
has been actual discovery of the breach. Both [section 400.2-607]
on notice of breach, and the present [section 400.2-608(2)] on
notice of revocation of acceptance, allow a reasonable time after
such discovery, if the discovery is itself in time. Whether dis-
covery has come too late is a separate question and a real one.
But that must not be confused with either phase of giving of
notice of the non-conformity or revocation of acceptance. Dis-
covery of a defect does not necessarily turn the buyer's mind im-
mediately to a claim for breach of warranty. Moreover, when goods
are already in use efforts to induce a cure or repair of the defect
will be made rather than a claim against the seller. Finally, a non-
merchant buyer will have an additional period of doubt and in-
quiry before he finds legal counsel and is advised what action to
take.
When a notice of breach has actually been given there is
normally a further period of investigation, possibly cure, possibly
negotiation, especially with respect to articles which are already in
use by the buyer. Generally, only when such possible adjustments
have failed does the question of revocation of acceptance enter.
Hence in most cases the reasonable time allowable for notice of
revocation of acceptance (which is a choice of remedy) extends
materially beyond the time in which notice of breach (which is
a warning of trouble) must be given....
The four periods of reasonable time discussed above must al-
ways be considered as interlocking. Thus, for instance, when the
reasonable time for rejection is extended by such a factor as ex-
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port any undue extension of time for discovery of a defect which
is not of a peculiarly elusive nature . . . must be avoided. Again
when stored goods are resold and suddenly discovered to be ma-
terially defective, the reasonable time for giving notice of the
breach is then necessarily short. Nevertheless, the distinction among
the four phases of time exist in fact and in the text of this [Code];
and each is important and should be applied according to its rea-
sons in any appropriate case.4 7
In the context of the comments, the foregoing would have appeared
between the last and next-to-last sentences of Comment 5 to UCO section
400.2-608.
Having revoked his acceptance, the buyer's position with regard to
the goods and his remedies is precisely the same as if he had rightfully
rejected them.
Looking again to negotiation and the staving off of an ineluctable
breach of contract, section 400.2-609 introduces a new concept in the form
of a party's "right to adequate assurance of performance." The statutory
provision is followed by a long comment, indicating that the concept of
assurance is not without prior foundation in case law. The motivation for
the section is obvious: commercial men contract with a view to performance
by one another, not merely for a promise or "the right to win a law suit." 4
Three steps for invoking the right are outlined in Sub-section (1) when
circumstances reasonably indicate that the expected performance may not
be forthcoming from the other party: i.e., suspension by the aggrieved party
of his own performance, the right to require adequate assurance of ex-
pected performance by the other, and the right of the aggrieved party
to treat the contract as broken if assurance is not received within 30 days.
Subsection (2) and the additional comments explain the meaning of the
terms in the section.
In determining when "reasonable grounds for insecurity" arise, the
Code rejects contract law reliance on dependent and independent promises
within a single contract as the controlling feature. Instead, the determina-
tion is made on the basis of the relatively non-technical but more highly
relevant grounds of commercial practice and commercial standards. In
other words, as stated in the comments "a ground for insecurity need not
arise from, or be directly related to, the contract in question."
49
47. Notes, Comment on 7-8 (S 97) at 5.
48. Comment 1 to UCC § 2-609 (1962).
49. Comment 3 to UCC § 2-609 (1962).
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The most direct assault on prior law under the Uniform Sales Act
is contained in subsection (3) of UCC section 400.2-609, which provides
that "acceptance of any improper delivery or payment does not prejudice
the aggrieved party's right to demand adequate assurance of performance,"
with the further implication that if the future assurance is not met, the
buyer's remedies are preserved. This provision is made necessary, state the
Notes,
by the failure of some courts to read the language of Section 49
of the Original Act as saving the buyer's remedies with respect
to the undelivered balance of the contract, after he has accepted
one or more defective installments. So far as such courts based
their rulings on the fact that the defects in the installment ac-
cepted were not material enough to make out a breach of the
whole contract, these holdings are continued by [UCC section
400.2-612] on breach in installment contracts. However .. . the
courts have been loath to apply the doctrine of anticipatory breach
with its extreme penalty, and buyers have frequently been forced
to continue their own performance in the face of their almost
certain knowledge that due counter-performance would not be
forthcoming. This section poses the question first as one of in-
security rather than "breach or virtual" repudiation. And [the
Code] insists that any buyer who because of need or decency
accepts a defective installment, shall not be forced to sacrifice
any of his remedies as to future installments, including his right to
suspend his own performance until he receives adequate assur-
ance of due performance by the other party.50
The Notes cite Lander v. Samuel Heller Leatker Co.,"' as an exam-
ple distinguishing the difference between "breach" and "insecurity." In
that case the seller and buyer contracted for the sale of 120,000 pounds of
leather, to be delivered and paid for in installments. After a defective
installment, the buyer refused to pay until the leather was "replaced." On
the seller's refusal to perform further, the buyer sued for breach of war-
ranty and damages for non-delivery of the balance. The seller's cross-
action claimed the unpaid price for the defective lots in which the buyer
had sought recoupment for breach of warranty. The lower court found
the leather to be defective and allowed the set-off against the seller's claim
for damages, but denied the buyer damages for non-performance. This
50. Notes, Comment on § 7-10 (S 98) at 6.
51. 314 Mass. 592, 50 N.E.2d 962 (1943). Accord, K & G Constr. Co. v. Har-
ris, 223 Md. 305, 164 A.2d 451 (1960).
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was reversed on appeal, the appellate court holding that the buyer's claim
of non-performance should have been sustained because his refusal to pay
did not amount to a, repudiation of the contract, although payment for
each installment normally is a part of such contracts. The court's reason-
ing was somewhat convoluted: since the buyer might accept goods and
set-off damages for breach of warranty-for which litigation and a judg-
ment would be required-he was therefore under no duty to pay until an
adjudication of the set-off to which he might be entitled.
What result under UCC section 400.2-609? Probably both parties would
have demanded assurances. On receipt of the defective delivery, section
400.2-609(3) would permit the buyer to accept and then demand assur-
ance that future deliveries would be up to par, similar to the Lander court's
allowance of an acceptance, while keeping the contract in force. But the
buyer's failure to give satisfactory assurance of substantial payment on
account would have been a repudiation after 30 days under section 400.2-
609(4). Or, as the Notes put it: "True, a seller who makes a defective
delivery must normally expect to wait for his money; but a buyer cannot
in good faith turn a contract into one for indefinite credit by repeated
acceptances and claims of recoupment, making no payment at all. '52
Comment 6 to UCC section 2-609 is, in the writer's opinion, an in-
teresting extension of the drafters' motivation into the Code. It is, in the
words of one writer,"3 a "time bomb" awaiting the unscrupulously un-
wary, because it does not relate to any specific portion of the statute but
rather qualifies any contract which seeks to "cancel or readjust the con-
tract when grounds for insecurity arise." It means, when read with the
section, that an attempt to make ineffective the provisions of section
400.2-609 by contract may be effective if the standards set are not arbi-
trary. The Notes which follow the language of Comment 6 indicate an
intent to reject such cases as Dow Clemical Co. v. Detroit Chem. Works,"4
in which the court enforced a clause under which the seller was held justi-
fied in cancelling a contract for monthly deliveries. A clause in the con-
tract conferred the right if buyer failed to pay according to the contract,
although the buyer had mailed a check several days after expiration of
the credit term for the first delivery. Cases following Dow Chemical are un-
52. Notes, Comment on § 7-10 (S 98) at 8.
53. Speaking of a case cited for a different proposition, Mooney, The Old and
the New: Article IX, 16 ARK. L. REv. 145, 155 (1962).
54. 208 Mich. 157, 175 N.W.2d 69 (1919).
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certain augurs of judicial attitude toward the upholding of such provisions. '
Traditionally an area of difficulty, the doctrine of anticipatory repudi-
ation, has been narrowed in scope under the Code. The aggrieved party
can, at least, confirm suspicious or vacillating conduct of the other party
by demanding an adequate assurance of performance; if assurance is re-
fused, there is a breach. Under section 400.2-610, the aggrieved party may
await performance for a commercially reasonable time or proceed with his
remedies despite notification that he would await the breaching party's
performance, and in either case he can suspend his own performance. If
the aggrieved party is the seller, he may suspend his performance, con-
tinue to identify certain conforming goods to the contract, resell un-
finished goods, or attempt to minimize loss of goods in the process of manu-
facture according to his reasonable commercial judgment.56 This follows
the Code principle that the breaching buyer-not the aggrieved seller-has
the burden of proving the seller's action after the breach was commercially
unreasonable.
Comment 2 to UCC section 2-610 emphasizes that it is not necessary
for repudiation that performance be made literally impossible; it is suffi-
cient if the action indicates a rejection of the continuing obligation. In
this connection, the comment further spells out that "a -demand by one
or both parties for more than the contract calls for by way of counter-per-
formance is not in itself a repudiation," unless an overt statement of in-
tention not to perform, except on conditions that exceed the contract, ac-.
companies the demand. As an example of a situation covered by this
proposition, the Notes again cite Lander v. Samuel Heller Leather Co.5r
There the contract called for 120,000 pounds of leather to be delivered at
reasonable intervals. On a defective delivery of 10,000 pounds, the buyer
demanded shipment of 80,000 pounds, yet to be delivered, within three days.
The buyer's action, say the Notes, "need not be regarded as having re-
pudiated the contract (assuming that the defect was not such as to justify
his cancellation for breach) unless he refuses to continue with the con-
tract if the deliveries are not forthcoming within that time."5 s
55. See, e.g., Republic-Odin Appliance Corp. v. Consumers Plumbing & Heat-
ing Supply Co., 92 Ohio L. Abs. 513, 192 N.E.2d 132 (C. P. 1963). But see Man-
court-Winters Coal Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 236 Mich. 323, 210 N.W. 244 (1926).
Cf. Gedanke v. Wisconsin Evaporated Milk Co., 215 Wis. 370, 254 N.W. 660
(1934).
56. § 400.2-704, RSMo 1963 Supp.
57. 314 Mass. 592, 50 N.E.2d 962 (1943).
58. Notes, Comment on § 7-11 (S 99) at 2.
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The test which must be met before a performing party can resort to
this Code provision is that the repudiation will substantially impair the
value of the contract. A breach which does less should not be "frozen" 9
before the time for performance. Thus, the aggrieved party could not sus-
pend his own performance or resort to his remedies. This is consonant
with the test for demanding an adequate assurance for performance under
UCC section 400.2-609: breach which threatens a minor right does not
justify suspension of performance until an assurance is given.
Still with an eye on upholding the contract if possible, section 400.2-611
permits the repudiating party to retract his anticipatory repudiation, by
giving notice, and, if demanded, assurances under section 400.2-609. The
aggrieved party, however, controls the situation at this point: if he has
cancelled the contract or materially changed his position after the repudia-
tion, the party in anticipatory breach may not retract. The section naturally
follows and complements both the concepts of anticipatory repudiation and
adequate assurance of performance.
Installment contracts have presented a variety of perplexing questions
under prior law. Frequently the most critical and basic problem is whether
the agreement is an installment contract or really a series of separate con-
tracts. In the latter case, of course, the buyer would have no right to can-
cel and refuse future deliveries no matter how many defective deliveries he
has endured in the past. 0 Even assuming the existence of a true install-
ment contract, what is the result when a party sues for breach of a single
installment? Is the entire contract repudiated, as an anticipatory breach
within section 400.2-610, or is the repudiation limited to the defective de-
livery?
Section 400.2-612(1) defines an installment contract as "one which
requires or authorizes the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately
accepted, even though the contract contains a clause 'each delivery is a
separate contract or its equivalent."'61 The provision squarely raises the
question whether it is possible to separately contract for successive de-
liveries of goods in the future. Comment 1 points out briefly that this sec-
tion of the Code covers installment deliveries "tacitly authorized by the
59. Id. at 3.
60. Hettrick Mfg. Co. v. Waxahachie Cotton Mills, 1 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1924)
(non-cancellation clause in contract for 40 separate deliveries held to create 40
separate contracts). The ruling of this case is specifically rejected by the Notes,
Comment on § 7-9 (S 101) at 5.
61. In drafting this clause, the Notes, Comment on § 7-9 (S 101) at 4, indi-




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [1965], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol30/iss2/5
BREACH, REPUDIATION AND EXCUSE
circumstances or by the option of either party," without reference to other
Code sections. The section cross reference mentions only section 400.2-307
which concerns delivery in single lot or several lots. Without something
more in the way of guidelines the scope of installment contracts could
indeed become bewildering.
Professor Llewellyn's Notes make both the intended scope of and the
inspiration for the section clearer. Section 400.2-307 says that all goods
under the contract must be tendered in a single delivery unless the circum-
stances give either party the right to demand delivery in lots, in which
case the price can be demanded for each lot if it can be apportioned . 2
Despite the lack of cross-references in the Code, his Notes also indicate
that section 400.2-311, on options as to assortment of goods and shipping
arrangements, is intended within the coverage of the installment contract
section. Further, the Notes contend,63 this section "merely reflects the view
of the sound cases," citing three.64
In other words, if the surrounding circumstances or the options avail-
able to buyer regarding assortment of goods, taken with the contract lan-
guage, indicate authorization for delivery and acceptance of installments,
there is an installment contract under the Code even though the contract
stipulates against it. Reading all the sections together, a serious question
arises whether it is possible any longer to enter into separate contracts for
future deliveries of goods in lots, even where the parties do so by separately
executed agreements.
On delivery of a non-conforming installment, section 400.2-612(2)
permits the buyer to reject when the non-conformity "substantially im-
pairs the value of the installment" and it cannot be cured, although the
buyer must accept if the seller gives adequate assurance of cure.35 If the
non-conformity or default in one or more installments "substantially im-
pairs the value of the whole contract," subsection (3) declares the contract
breached, but it can be reinstated in three circumstances: (1) if the ag-
grieved party fails to notify of his cancellation, or (2) when he sues for
62. Comment 2 to UCC § 2-612 (1962). This test is more liberal than under
prior law, which looked to what was clearly apportioned under the agreement.
63. Notes, Comment on § 7-9 (S 101) at 3.
64. Czamikow-Rionda Co. v. West Market Grocery Co., 21 F.2d 309 (2d
Cir. 1927); Lynn M. Ranger, Inc. v. Gildersleeve, 106 Conn. 372, 138 Atl. 142
(1927); Portfolio v. Rubin, 233 N.Y. 439, 135 N.E. 843 (1922). See generally
Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1117 (1953).
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breach of past installments or (3) demands performance of future install-
ments.
The Uniform Sales Act borrowed a broad and familiar concept from
the law of contracts in dealing with breaches of installment contracts:
"whether the breach is so material as to justify the injured party in re-
fusing to proceed and suing for damages for breach of the entire contract '6
Llewellyn described this test as "confused, ' 67 preferring to rest the Code
on the narrower issue of whether the value of the whole unperformed con-
tract is so substantially impaired as to warrant cancellation and damages.
The justification for this change, in regard to a buyer's default in pay-
ment or acceptance or a seller's default in delivery, is found in Helgar Corp.
v. Warner's Features, Inc.c in which the court (Cardozo, J.), speaking of
default in payment, said:
We must know the cause of the default, the length of the
delay, the needs of the vender, and the expectations of the vendee.
If the default is the result of accident or misfortune, if there is a
reasonable assurance that it will be promptly repaired, and if
immediate payment is not necessary to enable the vendor to pro-
ceed with performance, there may be one conclusion. If the breach
is wilful, if there is no just ground to look for prompt reparation,
if the delay has been substantial, or if the needs of the vendor
are urgent so that continued performance is imperiled, in these
and in other circumstances, there may be another conclusion.69
How does the Code provision relate to the materiality of the breach
test in the Uniform Sales Act? The Notes say,
A much lesser impairment, if it gives insecurity as to the con-
tract-breaker's future adequate performance, will justify "refusing"
66. UNIFO M SALES AcT § 45.
67. Notes, Comment on § 7-9 (S 101).
68. 222 N.Y. 449, 119 N.E. 113 (1918).
69. Id. at 454, 119 N.E. at 114. For illustrations of the operation of the rule
of the Helgar case in a variety of fact situations see Plotnick v. Pennsylvania
Smelting & Refining Co., 194 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 1952); Hall Roach Studios, Inc.
v. Film Classics, Inc., 156 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1946); A. R. A. Mfg. Co. v. Pierce,
86 Ariz. 928, 341 P.2d 928 (1959); Coughlin v. Blair, 41 Cal.2d 587, 262 P.2d 305
(1953) (rule applied to contract for sale of realty); Kann v. Wausau Abrasives
Co., 85 N.H. 41, 153 Atl. 823 (1931) (considers notice of non-consent to future
breaches); Agash Refining Corp. v. Soya Processing Co., 69 Ohio App. 175, 43
N.E.2d 311 (1942); William Feinstein Bros., Inc. v. L. Z. Hatte Granite Co., 123
Vt. 167, 184 A.2d 540 (1962). Even though two courts may purport to apply the
Hyelgar case, the differences in fact evaluation and emphasis may produce a varia-
tion in result. Compare Cosmopolitan Film Distributors, Inc. v. Feucht-Wanger
Corp., 226 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1962) with Hershey Farms, Inc. v. State, 202
Misc. 105, 110 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
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temporarily "to proceed," pending the result of a demand for as-
surance. This does not mean, however, a reversion "to the rule
of the English statute .. .which keeps the contract alive unless
the breach is equivalent to repudiation" [citing Helgar] . . .
if "equivalent to repudiation" &escribes such breach in install-
ments as indicates an intention not to perform. The question under
[the Code] goes not to intention as to the future, but to the de-
gree of injury actually suffered by the default. If that injury is
sufficient, it happens that the legal consequences are almost the
same as those entailed by a repudiation.7 0
In computing the degree of default, it should be noted that the de-
fects in prior installments are cumulative.71
Although the comments to UCC section 2-612 are substantial in
length, the Notes contain far more case citations and specific illustrations.
For example, midway through Comment 4 it is stated that either circum-
stances or the agreement may explain the need for conformity in a given
case, and "in such a case, the effect of the agreement is to define explicitly
what amounts to substantial impairment of value impossible to cure."
As originally drafted, the comment read: "Thus in a contract for precision
parts, chemicals for delicate use, or quality merchandise for a quality house,
the circumstances may give notice that even minor non-conformity sub-
stantially impairs the value for the purposes of the contract."' 2 Similarly,
Comment 5 suggests that on receipt of a discrepant delivery, good faith
may require a buyer to cure, as by severing out an acceptable amount in
case of an overshipment, but the buyer's duty extends only to "coopera-
tion." The obligation of cooperation may be hard to define in a commercial
context, and the comment lets the matter rest there. According to the
Notes:
The facts of Burrows & Kenyon, Inc. v. Warren [9 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1925)], although not involving an installment contract,
present an instance of the type of cooperation expected from the
buyer under [the Code]. In that case a cargo of lumber arrived
at the buyer's dock in sizes at great variance with the contract.
The market had dropped. The seller offered to sort out the appropri-
ate lumber and to supply any deficiency from local stocks. Nothing
appeared to show the materiality of the short delay thus involved.
Under [the Code] the minor extra expense incurred by the buyer
through having surveyors and labor at the dock to sort the lum-
ber is plainly curable by allowance on the price; the only question
70. Notes, Comments on § 7-9 (S 101) at 7.
71. Comment 6 to UCC § 2-612 (1962).
72. Notes, Comment on § 7-9 (S 101) at 8.
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would be whether the obstruction of the dock would amount to
an unreasonable burden. If it would not, the seller's proposed cure
would be in order. Similarly, on the facts of Jackson v. Rotax
Motor & Cycle Co. [1910] 2 K.B. 937 (C.A.), where part of a
shipment of motor horns arrived in London in a damaged condi-
tion, but the dents were such as could be straightened and the
necessary repolishing done by relatively simple and inexpensive
processes. Under [the Code] the question would turn not on ac-
curate conformity of the delivery as it did in that case, but on
whether an unreasonable burden of trouble and delay would be
involved in refinishing, as it might well be, for instance, by disrupt-
ing a production schedule. But plainly.., it is the seller who must
take over a cure which involves any material burden; the buyer's
obligation reaches only to cooperation, to paying a minor excess
of freight, or to separating a certain number of casks from a larger
bulk. He is not required to engage in even minor manufacturing
operations on goods agreed to be delivered in merchantable condi-
tion unless the circumstances indicate that such touching up would
be simple for the buyer .... (For example, a delivery of parts to
a manufacturer for further manufacture where no dislocation of
the buyer's production schedule would be involved and the cost
of rework would be minor.) .... Adequate assurance for purposes
of this subsection is measured by the same standards as under
[UCC section 400.2-609] on right to adequate assurance of per-
formance.73
Disputes involving installment contracts will have to be resolved
differently under the Code than in the past, it is certain, but what is
relatively uncertain is the extent to which the many new ingredients added
by UCC section 400.2-612 will themselves have to be settled by separate
law suits.
Except for this section, very little of the common law and the Uni-
form Sales Act preoccupation with the title passages has infiltrated Part
6 of Article 2, primarily because these sections explore devices that may
aid avoidance of an irreparable breach. It is, indeed, the Code's preoccupa-
tion with contract rather than title which permits the self-help or quasi-
remedies, since a party can retreat from a partial breach of contract with
relative ease compared with the almost insuperable problem under the
common law of revesting a title which has passed.
Thus, section 400.2-613 combines both its former counterparts in the
Uniform Sales Act 74 into one relatively easy to administer section. Normally,
73. Id. at 10.
74. UNIFORM SALES Acr §§ 7, 8.
[Vol. 30
26
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [1965], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol30/iss2/5
BREACH, REPUDIATION AND EXCUSE
risk of loss is determined by UCC sections 400.2-509 and 400.2-510, but
in the case of goods identified wien the contract is made, if risk has not yet
passed or if the seller contractually retains it (e.g., "no arrival, no sale"),
on total loss of the goods without fault the contract is avoided. If the
goods are partially destroyed, however, the buyer may demand inspection
and at his option avoid the contract or accept the goods with an allowance
from the price for the deterioration or deficiency in quantity.
The Uniform Sales Act, following the "sale-contract to sell" dichotomy"5
with logical consistency, necessarily handled destruction of goods in two
sections: section 7 applied when title had passed, and section 8 when there
was a contract to sell. In either case, commercial practicality demanded
that the contract or sale was avoided if the goods wholly perished or had
been destroyed without knowledge or fault of the parties prior to the con-
tract. Here the Uniform Sales Act provisions paralleled the Code. But when
the goods had been partially destroyed logical consistency rather incon-
gruously demanded that the buyer could elect to treat the title as having
passed to so much of the rubble as was left intact. The buyer's problem did
not end, by any means, when he had decided what might be salvaged be-
cause the Uniform Sales Act further provided that he had to pay the
full price if the contract was indivisible. The Code side-steps this technical
problem by the "due allowance" provision already mentioned, and the sec-
tion is a particularly clear illustration of the desirability of deciding con-
tract problems by contract rather than property principles.
UCC section 400.2-614 concerns a limited kind of contract frustration,
arising where an agreed type of shipping or goods handling (subsection 1),
or manner of payment (subsection 2) becomes commercially impracticable
or, of course, literally impossible. Methods of shipment and payment are
subsidiary to the primary purpose of the contract, which is the anticipated
transfer of goods to the buyer and his payment for them. Rather than
calling off the contract this section requires the tender and acceptance of a
commercially reasonable substitute.
Comment 1 to UCC section 2-614 is one of the rare ones which cites
cases as exemplars. What is not unusual is the absence of cases considered
at length in the Notes, and the paucity of cross-references in the comments
following the section. Again, the reader must judge for himself whether
further illustration would have been helpful.
The third paragraph of Comment 1 states that "There must be a true
75. Compare UNIFoRM SALES AcT § 1 with § 400.2-106(l), RSMo 1963 Supp.
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commercial impracticability to excuse the agreed to performance and justify
a substituted performance." The Notes cite two cases,7 not involving sub-
stituted performance, in which the seller could not resist a recovery when
his ability to perform or ship failed unexpectedly. In neither had he exer-
cised diligence or good faith in attempting to overcome a failure in his
source of supply or to obtain shipping permits under an embargo, respec-
tively, but both are given as examples of the type of commercial impracti-
cability which might properly be the subject of this section.77
Nor do the section or its comment answer what is surely to become
a question of application: does performance become commercially im-
practicable when unforeseen circumstances greatly increase the expenses
of either party? An English case, Blackburn Bobbin Co. v. Allen,7 8 which
Llewellyn feels would be in the borderline category under the Code, is
discussed at length in the Notes.79 In this case Finnish timber was to be
shipped to an English buyer. In 1914 the war blocked normal sea transport,
but the buyer did not insist on delivery, nor did he abandon the contract.
Two years later he found that Finnish timber was arriving in England and
demanded delivery. In fact, shipments were being made by rail through
Sweden, and the more expensive transportation and other factors had more
than doubled the market price. On refusal to deliver, the seller had to
respond in damages. Of the Blackburn Bobbin case, the Notes say:
So far as concerns the delay in delivery the result of this case is
approved by [UCC section 400.2-6151 on . . . failure of presup-
posed conditions. So far as a possible total excuse from performance
is concerned, the availability of rail shipment through Sweden
goes to the edge of the idea of a commercially practicable sub-
stitute within the present section. The policy of this section ma-
terially relaxes the stringency of the "old law" which the court
considered basic in this case, namely that a party must make
good on his contract despite the occurrence of any contingencies
76. Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 258 N.Y. 194,
179 N.E. 383 (1932); Washington Mfg. Co. v. Midland Lbr. Co., 113 Wash. 593,
194 Pac. 777 (1921).
77. Rejected in the Notes, Comment on § 6-2 (S 86) at 3 as a "rigid and
uncommercial ruling" is Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Gregson, 303
Ill. 458, 135 N.E. 715 (1922). In this case the contract called for "immediate"
shipment on a "through" bill of lading from Philadelphia. When the seller could
not obtain a through bill at Philadelphia he shipped by domestic bill to New
York City, where a through bill could be acquired. On destruction of the goods
in transit to New York, the seller was held to -bear risk of loss because the method
of shipment was non-conforming.
78. [1918J 2 K.B. 467 (C.A.).
79. Notes, Comment on § 6-2 (S 86) at 4.
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against which he might have protected himself in the agreement.
Under [the Code] the question is not merely one of an increase
in expense, for each party contracts with the knowledge that the
market may turn against him. However, where unforeseen circum-
stances operate in such a way as to greatly increase the expense of
either party, the agreed performance may be said to have become
commercial impracticable."0
Except for cross-references to Article 5 in the comment, the reader is
left to his own ingenuity or experience in digging through the Code to re-
late substituted' performance to other sections. If supervening casualty pre-
vents the seller from supplying the goods contracted for and he has a com-
mercially reasonable substitute, the Notes indicate that section 400.2-613
on casualty to identified goods, section 400.2-615 on allocation among sel-
ler's customers and section 400.2-610 on anticipatory repudiation combine
to provide a solution.
The buyer, of course, cannot be forced to accept any goods which
do not fit the contract. But good faith and observance of decent
commercial standards require a seller who is claiming excuse from
performance to do what he can to reduce the casualty to the buyer
by due notice and offer of substitution where possible with any
appropriate reduction in the price.81
A sophisticate in using the Uniform Commercial Code can often be
detected by the somewhat automatic and dexterous manner in which he
flips from one section to another. One wonders whether, without the cross-
referencing provided in the Notes, a new hand at the game (or an old one,
for that matter) would quickly perceive the relation among these sections.
III. NEw-EXCUSE-FAILURE OF CONDITIONS
Prior sections of Part 6 have introduced concepts whose interplay
and difficulties of application are measurable, more or less, by investiga-
tion of the judicial interpretation of older commercial statutes. Section
400.2-615, "Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions," has no counter-
80. Ibid. It was not shown that the buyer knew that English dealers did not
stock Finnish timber or that water shipment was customary, so these were not
circumstances within the contemplation of the parties which would render the
contract avoidable. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a merchant buyer
probably would be responsible for such knowledge.
81. Notes, Comment on § 6-2 (S 86) at 6.
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part in prior case or statutory law; its meaning and effect are immeasurably
more difficult to prognosticate.
In essence, the purpose of this section of the Code is to excuse a seller
from timely delivery of goods if supervening circumstances not contem-
plated by the parties on contracting make his performance commercially
impracticable . 2 The Notes, again more complete than the comment, trace
the two lines of case development seeking results which will be obtained
under section 400.2-615. The first line of cases excused the seller where his
performance actually became impossible, as in the case of death of a specific
animal contracted to be sold. This rule later extended to future crops grown
on agreed land,8 3 and when a specified means of production of the contract
subject matter was damaged or destroyed." This section of the Code is
intended to cover failure of agreed shipping facilities, recognized as a valid
excuse by some cases; s in this contingency, it differs from the prior sec-
tion, section 400.2-614 ("substituted performance"), in degree.
The Code section is meant to overcome the limitation in some earlier
cases that the contract or its performance had to be absolutely prohibited
by local law.' According to Comment 5, it will be sufficient if the seller in
good faith believes himself to be under a restriction, whether it is "law"
or a governmental regulation lacking the full force of law, as long as it is
truly supervening and beyond the seller's undertaking in the contract. As
to the latter, it must be remembered that a "merchant" seller under the
Code might be expected to anticipate certain restrictive measures at the time
of contracting87
The second line of cases split on the validity and extent of application
of "seller's exemption clauses" which have become prevalent in commercial
82. Whitman v. Anglum, 92 Conn. 392, 103 AtI. 114 (1918) is given as an
example of cases illustrating the need for this section. Notes, Comment on § 6-3
(S 87) at 1.
83. Ontario Deciduous Fruit-Growers Ass'n v. Cutting Fruit-Packing Co.,
134 Cal. 21, 66 Pac. 28 (1901). See also C. G. Davis & Co. v. Bishop, 139 Ark.
273, 213 S.W. 744 (1919); Otto Seidenberg, Inc. v. Tautfest, 155 Ore. 420, 64 P.2d
534 (1937). Contra, Anderson v. May, 50 Minn. 280, 52 N.W. 530 (1892). Com-
pare Powers v. Siats, 24 Minn. 515, 70 N.W.2d 344 (1955).
84. Leavenworth State Bank v. Cashmere Apple Co., 118 Wash. 356, 204
Pac. 5 (1922).
85. Reid-Murdock Co. v. Alton Mercantile Co., 287 Fed. 460 (8th Cir. 1920).
86. Better cases were more liberal: Mawhinny v. Millbrook Woolen Mills, Inc.,
234 N.Y. 244, 137 N.E. 218 (1921) (government "requested" priority treated as
compulsory); Ralli Bros. v. Campania Naviera Sota Aznar, [19201 2 K.B. 287
(freight charges under contract executed in England, illegal in Spain, the place of
performance, treated as excuse).
87. See text accompanying Note 80 supra.
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contracts. Clauses of this type contractually recognize the possibility of
contingencies developing which may make the seller's performance unduly
burdensome and, should they arise, excuse him from performance or permit
delay. One line of cases severely limited the operation of such clauses by an
ejusdem generis interpretation,8 making it dangerous for sellers to stipulate
one kind of excuse situation without stipulating every possible contingency.
The other line looked to the purposes behind the clauses and interpretated
them liberally1 9 It is not surprising that the Code, deeming exemption
clauses reasonable in certain commercial circumstances, adopts the latter
cases, and expressly refrains from exhaustively supplying illustrative con-
tingencies, in the event exemption clauses under section 400.2-615 come
before courts which have interpreted them narrowly.90 The comments,
however, suggest contingencies that might invoke the excuse provisions of
the section: severe shortage of supplies, raw material or labor,9 or, rarely,
unexpected failure to secure adequate financing. The test seems to be how
remote the contingency is from the contract, how clearly it falls within the
contemplated business risks, and assurance that whatever contingencies
develop are outside the seller's control.
It would be fantasy to suggest that section 400.2-615 solves the diffi-
cult problems inherent in the seller's failing to perform by failure of pre-
supposed conditions. Assuming that the provision is commercially justifi-
able and that it is inspired by cases which are the more commercially
sound, it is nevertheless difficult to envision its potential range of opera-
tion. For one thing, the very definition of "presupposed conditions" may
become controversial: what result where technological change debases
every expectation of the buyer's need for or the seller's expectation of sup-
plying the subject matter? The examples given in the comment suggest
that the conditions intended to be covered must be something more prosaic,
although the cases cited in the Notes (some of which have been included
in these footnotes) suggest that Professor Llewellyn was seeking the widest
possible application of this section. Section 400.2-615(b), permitting the
seller to allocate production and delivery in any manner which is fair and
88. Davis Co. v. Hoffman-LaRoche Chem. Works, 178 App. Div. 855, 166
N.Y. Supp. 179 (1917); Sunseri v. Garcia & Maggini Co., 298 Pa. 249, 148 Atl.
81 (1929).
89. Davis v. Columbia Coal Mining Co., 170 Mass. 391, 49 N.E. 629 (1898)(clause excusing seller from damage because of strike construed to cover carrier
strike responsible for interrupting shipment); Canadian Steel Foundries Co. v.
Thomas Furnace Co., 188 Wis. 557, 203 N.E. 355 (1925).
90. Comment 2 to UCC § 2-615 (1962).
91. Cf. Vale v. Suiter & Dunbar, 58 W.Va. 353, 52 S.E. 313 (1905).
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reasonable after excusable interruption, may contain the seeds of litigation,
especially if the buyer may then be forced to breach his own contracts.
Although excuse applying to the buyer is not mentioned in the statute,
Comment 9 suggests that in certain circumstances this section may also
exempt the buyer. If buyers, sellers and the courts treat section 400.2-615
as a specific application of the organic requirement of "good faith" 2 in
commercial transactions, simple contemplation of the after effects of the
provision may lead the parties to further negotiation and amicable settle-
ment of the problem raised by failure of presupposed conditions.
The effect of the seller's invocation of section 400.2-615 is determined
by the last section of Part 6, section 400.2-616, whose succinctness may by
and large solve many of the questions raised about the scope of the prior
section. When he receives the seller's written notice of a delay or alloca-
tion of production or delivery, the buyer may terminate the contract or
modify it by agreeing to take the quota.93 If he does nothing within 30
days, the contract is terminated automatically. No reference is made to a
seller's attempt to retract his notice within the 30 day period if he dis-
covers he can fully perform, as in the case of anticipatory repudiation."
Presumably seller would have this right if he had received no notice of
termination from the buyer. Subsection (3) of section 400.2-616 prohibits
contract terms which would require a buyer to take delivery at some un-
foreseen time in the future from a seller who has been excused from de-
livery, a reasonable precaution in view of the possible latitude of section
400.2-615.
IV. CONCLUSION
The reader probably has noticed the immoderate length of some of
the quoted excerpts from the Notes. This is perhaps not de rbgle in current
law review writing but in this instance was necessary to accomplish the
writer's purposes, which were two: first, to achieve a reasonable exposition
of Part 6 of Article 2 without undue repetition of the statutory language,
which has to be done on the sometimes risky assumption that the reader
has read the act or is reading it along with the present commentary. Sec-
ondly, the Llewellyn Notes have provided an opportunity to explore the
92. § 400.1-203, RSMo 1963 Supp.
93. No consideration is necessary to support the modification; § 400.2-209(1),
RSMo 1963 Supp.
94. § 400.2-611, RSMo 1963 Supp., considered supra.
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sources and background of this part of Article 2 and to evaluate the
drafters' work, as they constructed the Code and the comments.
What do the Notes reveal? On the specific level, it is apparent that
the comments as finally approved are an extremely terse and cryptic ex-
tract of the preparatory material drafted and considered in connection
with the proposed Uniform Revised Sales Act, which ultimately became
Article 2 of the Code. Freedom from the bonds of prior case law and the
citations which accompany it is a noble objective if statutory language
can be executed with sufficient precision to transcend the niggling reserva-
tions for which common lawyers are famous. Certainly many Code provi-
sions raise questions, but by and large the objective has been nobly at-
tained. The writer's impression is that the English language is not suffi-
ciently precise to delineate a Code which anticipates the varieties of prob-
lems which can arise in commercial transactions. Evidently this feeling was
shared by the drafters-else, why any comments at all? Are the comments
satisfactory in their present form?
It is axiomatic among commercial law teachers that the comments
never should have been drafted-or printed, anyway. They tend to raise
rather than solve legal questions, and it seems to the writer, after having
examined the Notes on what became Part 6 (admittedly a miniscule por-
tion of Article 2) that the comments do not serve nearly as well as the
Notes because the latter contain far more exemplary material. Putting it
another way, the drafters seem to have operated under two questionable
assumptions. One is that the average practitioner caught up in a com-
mercial law case knows a great deal about commercial practices and usages,
so that he can envision how an open-ended section may apply in a con-
crete factual setting. The second is that the inclusion of illustrative situ-
ations in the comments would have constricted the interpretation and de-
velopment of Code principles to the situations actually set out in the
comments.
One of the Notes goes beyond commentary on the immediate section
and describes the purpose of Article 2:
The whole policy of [the Code] as well as its numerous
specific sections looks toward furthering negotiations leading to an
amicable adjustment of a dispute. The flat option given to the
buyer under [section 400.2-601], either to accept or reject when
the seller's tender or delivery fails to conform, by no means elimi-
nates the possibility of such negotiation. The purpose of that sec-
tion is to afford unambiguous protection to the buyer in taking any
commercially reasonable action and this purpose is buttressed by
1965]
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the options given to the buyer under [section 400.2-604] as to
salvage of rightfully rejected goods. The state of facts, however, is
rarely clear or agreed upon when a possible refusal of acceptance
comes in question and [the Code] seeks to avoid forcing either
party to commit himself at his peril to what a jury may decide,
weeks or months later, as to the conformity of the tender. The
provisions of this section, therefore, must be appropriately limited
or modified when a negotiation is underway.95
The cases upon which some of the propositions of Part 6 are based
have stood the test of subsequent litigation, as indicated in the footnotes,
and presumably this is true of other sections of Article 2. The writer's im-
pression, after making a detailed study of the Notes underlying Part 6, is
that the Code itself can stand on its own expert drafting but that the
drafters' ambitions for the Code would not be impaired by the publication
of whatever notes eventually come to light, suitably edited for the occasion.
95. Notes, Comment on 7-2 (S 91) at 3.
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